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  INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS:  
BECOMING A PAPER TIGER?* 
STEPHEN B. BURBANK** 
  
 
In July 2011, I participated in a panel discussion in Germany 
that was organized for corporate defense counsel.  The underlying 
premise was that German and other foreign companies need 
protection against litigation in United States courts, and the goal 
was to discuss strategies that would meet that need.  Thus, for 
instance, in a global litigation landscape that lacks the strict and 
mutually binding lis pendens rule of the Brussels regime,1 is there 
a tactical weapon comparable to the infamous ―Italian torpedo?‖  
That colorful metaphor conceives a would-be plaintiff‘s case as a 
ship and suggests the effect on it of conferring the benefits of the 
EU‘s strict lis pendens rule on actions for a negative declaration 
(declaratory judgment) when filed first in Italy‘s sclerotic judicial 
system, which is badly in need of angioplasty.2 
 
* © Stephen B. Burbank 2012 
** David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
1 Article 21 of the Brussels Convention has been described as ―rigid, 
mechanical and crude‖ by a common law court.  Neste Chemicals SA v. DK Line 
SA, [1994] 3 All E.R. 180 [184] (Eng.).  This provision now appears as Article 27 of 
Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (providing that any court other 
than the first in which action is brought must stay proceedings until jurisdiction in 
the first is established and then must decline jurisdiction). 
2 See Case C-406/92, The Maciej Rataj, Tatry v. Maciej Rataj, 1994 E.C.R. I-
05439 (―On a proper construction of Article 21 of the Convention, where it 
requires, as a condition of the obligation of the second court seised to decline 
jurisdiction, that the parties to the two actions be identical, that cannot depend on 
the procedural position of each of them in the two actions.‖); Stephen B. Burbank, 
All The World His Stage, 52  AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 755–56 (2004) (reviewing ARTHUR 
TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE, POLICIES 
AND PRACTICE OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS (2003)) (discussing von 
Mehren‘s advocacy of a rule that would not give precedence to declaratory 
judgment actions). 
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Although I was delighted to participate in such a discussion, I 
suggested that, even if still correct in 2011, the underlying premise 
may be on the cutting edge of obsolescence.  In my view, the need 
of foreign companies for protection against litigation in U.S. courts 
is less today than it has been in decades, in both absolute and 
comparative dimensions.  As evidence supporting that hypothesis, 
I offer recent developments in three areas that are critical to access 
to United States courts:  class actions, pleading, and personal 
jurisdiction. 
The assault on class actions—which, given the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)3 and Supreme Court decisions 
worshipping one particular, highly contestable, vision of 
arbitration,4 should be deemed a two-pronged attack aimed at both 
federal and state courts—is well underway.  The class action 
decision of the past few years that may be best known abroad 
probably should not be described as such.  I refer to Morrison v. 
Nat’l Australia Bank,5 a 2010 decision in which the Court held that 
Section 10(b), the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange 
Act,6 does not apply extraterritorially to provide a cause of action 
to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for 
 
3 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 19 Stat. 4 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  For an account of CAFA that sets it in historical 
context and, while acknowledging a reasonable basis for federal legislation, 
argues that the exceptions are too narrow, inappropriately denying state courts 
the power to pursue an independent vision of class actions in cases where they 
should have that power, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act in 
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008). 
4 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding 
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts unconscionability analysis under 
California law of class waivers in consumer contracts); Rent-A-Center, W. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776–81 (2010) (holding that under the FAA where an 
arbitration agreement expressly delegates the decision of the arbitration 
agreement‘s enforceability to an arbitrator, a court may not intercede unless the 
claim of unconscionability is directed to that particular provision of the arbitration 
agreement); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int‘l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) 
(holding that the FAA prohibits arbitrators from imposing class arbitration absent 
a contractual basis for concluding that the parties consented); see also Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion and the Future of Arbitration, AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. (forthcoming 2012) 
(pointing to a pro-arbitration trend in recent court decisions that has limited the 
judiciary‘s oversight of arbitration).  ―Now, however, it should be apparent that in 
its zeal to further its evolving vision of the [Federal Arbitration Act] the Court has 
eliminated key safeguards aimed at ensuring fundamental fairness to consumers 
and employees in arbitration.‖  Id. (manuscript at 113). 
5 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
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alleged misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign 
exchanges. 
For American scholars of international civil litigation, Morrison 
is chiefly of interest because Justice Scalia was able to carry a 
majority in favor of a presumption against extraterritorial 
application of a federal statute that the lower federal courts—led 
by the great Second Circuit judge, Henry Friendly—had applied 
extraterritorially for more than forty years.7  That said, no Justice 
who participated (Justice Sotomayor did not) disagreed with the 
result in this so-called ―f-cubed‖ case—foreign plaintiffs 
purchasing shares of a foreign issuer on a foreign exchange.  One 
reason may have been that, having acknowledged that ―it is a rare 
case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact 
with the territory of the United States,‖8 the majority made quite a 
convincing argument based on the language of the statute that 
―Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the 
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.‖9 
What does Morrison have to do with class actions?  It was 
brought as a class action on behalf of foreign purchasers of the 
defendant bank‘s ordinary shares.  Moreover, although empirical 
studies suggest that some institutional investors prefer to opt out 
of class actions in order to pursue individual litigation under the 
securities laws,10 class actions are undoubtedly more likely than 
individual actions to make potential foreign defendants quake 
 
7 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding 
that anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws ―[a]pply to losses from 
sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable 
failures to act) of material importance in the United States have significantly 
contributed thereto‖ but ―[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities to 
foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within 
the United States directly caused such losses‖); see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–80, 
2883 (critically reviewing the Second Circuit‘s development of its own 
extraterritoriality tests and holding that there must be an ―affirmative indication‖ 
of Congress‘s intent for a law to apply extraterritorially). 
8 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878-80, at 2884. 
9 Id. at 2888. 
10 See Joshua H. Vinik et al, Why Institutional Investors are Opting Out of Class-
Action Litigation, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS  (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/PRINTSUB/307259985/ 
(identifying a growing trend among institutional investors to opt out of large class 
actions in light of successful individual settlements that have been up to fifty 
times larger than class settlements).  
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with fear, thereby making Morrison an even more welcome 
decision.  Finally, a careful reader of the Court‘s opinion will have 
noticed another reason for celebration in those circles.  For, in the 
course of rejecting the Solicitor General‘s proposed ―significant and 
material conduct‖ test, the majority observed that someone 
―attracted by the desirable consequences of‖ that test ―should also 
be repulsed by its adverse consequences.‖11  Justice Scalia 
continued:  ―While there is no reason to believe that the United 
States has become the Barbary Coast for those perpetrating frauds 
on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has become the 
Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those 
allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets.‖12  A majority of 
the Court was here signaling hostility to class actions that is not 
confined to the securities laws. 
One of the foundational assumptions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure is that the same rules apply in every type of case – 
they are trans-substantive.13  As a result, interpretations of Federal 
Rules that favor access to court do so over the entire domain of 
federal and state substantive law that governs actions in federal 
court.  In the case of the federal class action rule, Rule 23, the result 
has been that, from the perspective of private enforcement, it has 
been a wild card, fortuitously serving or frustrating the 
enforcement goals of Congress and state legislatures.14  In recent 
decades, however, an increasingly conservative federal judiciary 
has repented the early and sometimes unreflective embrace of Rule 
23 and has made it progressively more difficult for classes to be 
 
11 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.  
12 Id. 
13 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 535, 541–42 (discussing the assumption that ―general rules‖ require 
uniformity across both geography and subject matter by the Advisory Committee 
appointed by the 1935 Supreme Court). 
14 See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private 
Enforcement of Statutory and Administrative Law in the United States (and Other 
Common Law Countries) 47–48 (Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 356, 2011), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/356/ (discussing the fact that Rule 
23 creates incentives for private enforcement, but ―might yield inefficient over-
enforcement‖); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the 
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 53–74 (2010) (describing 
the development of Rule 23 and arguing that the plurality opinion in Shady Grove 
failed to accord state regulatory policy proper respect, preferring formalism to 
pragmatism). 
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certified.15  This belt-tightening also has been necessarily trans-
substantive.  In addition, at least when controlled by Republicans, 
Congress has abetted the process of retrenchment, both directly 
through substance-specific legislation like the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 199516 and indirectly through CAFA. 
The hostility to class actions, suggested in Justice Scalia‘s 
dictum in Morrison, was given room to operate with actual 
consequences in his opinion for the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes.17  Nobody I know thought that the enormous national class 
certified in that employment discrimination case could survive 
review, and there were some who thought the decision might be 
unanimous.  The Court was unanimous in reversing certification, 
but it was split 5-4 on the reasons for that decision.  Speaking 
through Justice Scalia, the conservative majority put forty-five 
years of class action jurisprudence in question by very restrictively 
interpreting the so-called ―commonality‖ requirement of Rule 
23(a).18  Together with decisions of courts of appeals imposing 
trial-like evidentiary burdens on proponents of class certification, 
including with respect to evidence offered by experts,19 Wal-Mart 
suggests that prospective foreign defendants should look more 
closely before they quake. 
Of course, just as differences in procedure may better explain 
both an initial choice of forum and a forum non conveniens motion 
than do substantive law differences,20 potentially ruinous liability 
 
15 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1489–99, 1507 (noting the increasingly 
stringent application of the predominance requirement and other more 
demanding class certification requirements as a response to mass tort claims). 
16 Pub. L. No 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class 
Action in American Securities Regulation, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INT‘L 321, 
329–32 (1999) (evaluating the motivations underpinning the 1995 Republican 
Congress‘s adoption of the securities litigation reform act and its impact on 
securities litigation). 
17 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
18 See id. at 2550–57 (holding that commonality requires plaintiffs to show 
that each member of the class suffered an identical injury that permits class-wide 
resolution of a single common question). 
19 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 
2008) (requiring factual determinations supporting certification to be made by a 
preponderance of the evidence and making clear that district courts must weigh 
conflicting expert testimony at the certification stage). 
20 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, The Proposed Hague 
Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 242 (2001) (―The 
realities of international forum selection revealed by decisions in the United States 
and abroad demonstrate that the American legal system is distinctive as much for 
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on the merits is not the only reason foreign defendants want to 
avoid litigation in American courts.  From that perspective, there is 
a good news/bad news quality to the increasingly agnostic, if not 
skeptical, posture of the federal courts with respect to class 
certification.  For the more class certification procedure is 
assimilated to trial procedure, the more discovery courts will have 
to permit before ruling on certification.  Moreover, even though 
good social science does not support claims that discovery 
everywhere and always imposes disproportionate expense,21 it 
clearly may do so in complex, high-stakes cases of which class 
actions constitute the core.  Indeed, the perfect storm of another 
enormous class action and the enormous cost of discovery that it 
could have entailed caused the Court, in 2007, to begin a process of 
dismantling the system of so-called ―notice pleading‖ that had 
been in place since 1938 and that the Court had repeatedly 
reaffirmed in the intervening years.  I refer to the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,22 a massive putative class 
action that alleged an antitrust conspiracy by the firms remaining 
after the breakup of AT&T. 
Believing that the cost of discovery is a widespread problem 
which federal judges are incapable of managing and that summary 
judgment comes too late—without evidence and without even 
referring to three sets of Federal Rules amendments addressing 
discovery over the past twenty years —23the Court sought to solve 
those problems not through interpretation of the discovery rules, 
but through judicial amendment of the pleading rules, thus 
facilitating early dismissals.  Since those rules, like all Federal 
Rules, are trans-substantive, the resulting requirement that 
plaintiffs plead sufficient factual matter, taken as true, to state a 
claim that is ―plausible‖ applies across-the-board.24  The Court 
 
the rules by which it ensures and fructifies access to court as by its rules of 
substantive law.‖). 
21 See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393 (1994) (chronicling the absence of any strong evidence of discovery 
abuse at the federal level and the failure of the rulemaking committee to evaluate 
its absence before embarking on discovery reform). 
22 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
23 See id. at 558–60 (presuming antitrust discovery to be a costly affair that 
forces cost-conscious defendants to settle even when faced with a weaker case). 
24 See Burbank, supra note 13, at 561–62 (discussing the judiciary‘s role in 
reinterpreting the trans-substantive pleading rules and a nation-wide movement 
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specifically so affirmed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,25 a 2009 decision in 
which the conservative majority consigned judgments about the 
plausibility of a complaint‘s allegations to the tender mercy of 
―judicial experience and common sense.‖26  The result should be 
cause for celebration by Chambers of Commerce everywhere, 
whatever baneful effect it has on access to court for the usual 
victims of procedural reform in a society that is allergic to robust 
public enforcement of statutory and administrative law.  The 
courthouse door must be closed to employment discrimination 
plaintiffs so that corporate defendants are spared potentially 
disproportionate discovery costs. 
Finally, by way of evidence that the traditional view abroad of 
litigation in American courts may not have kept pace with more 
recent developments, Wal-Mart was not the only decision of the 
just-ended term of the Supreme Court that foreign enterprise 
should greet with champagne.  CAFA has taken care of most of the 
mischief, real or imagined, perpetrated by state courts in large class 
actions.  But, except for so-called ―mass actions,‖27 CAFA does 
nothing to address excesses of forum shopping in litigation 
brought on behalf of individuals, including in particular litigation 
raising product liability claims.  In two cases testing federal 
constitutional limitations on assertions of personal jurisdiction by 
state courts, the Supreme Court made it harder to sue foreign 
defendants.  
In one of those cases, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown,28 a unanimous Court reaffirmed the proposition that 
general jurisdiction based on the defendant‘s business activities—
where the claim does not arise out of those activities in the 
forum—is available only in situations where the defendant has 
 
of chipping away at private litigation regimes to compensate injuries and enforce 
societal norms).  
25 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–53 (2009) (holding that the Twombly plausibility 
requirement does not just apply to antitrust claims, but to all civil actions as a 
general pleading requirement).  
26 Id. at 1950.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern 
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 115 (2009) (―Relying on ‗judicial experience 
and common sense,‘ the Court found the complaint implausible . . . .  [T]he Court 
also made clear that its approach applies across the board—that Twombly cannot 
be confined to its substantive context . . . or according to some other criterion.‖).  
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2006) (defining ―mass action‖); id. § 11(A) 
(2006) (providing that it ―shall be deemed to be a class action‖). 
28 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850–51 (2011). 
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conducted substantial systematic and continuous activities in the 
forum such that it can be deemed ―at home‖ in that forum, a test 
that now may require that a corporation either be incorporated or 
have its principal place of business in the forum.29  In the other, J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. V. Nicastro,30 a badly divided Court held 
unconstitutional an assertion of specific jurisdiction by a state court 
in a case brought by a plaintiff who was injured in that state by a 
product manufactured in the United Kingdom by a company that 
engaged an independent distributor to market its products 
throughout the United States.  The type of jurisdiction was specific 
rather than general because the plaintiff‘s claim arose out of the 
operation of defendant‘s product in the state where he sued.  The 
constitutional issue turned on whether presence of the putatively 
defective machine in the state was the result of purposeful efforts 
of the defendant.  
Goodyear is reasonably well done.  Unfortunately, however, 
Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion for the Court does not manifest 
understanding that, in thinking about doing business jurisdiction 
as involving defendants ―essentially at home,‖31 the Court is 
replacing the fiction of presence, which it rejected long ago, with 
the fiction of domicile.32  One might think that harmless error, but 
footnote 5 in the opinion strongly suggests that it is not.  There, 
Justice Ginsburg confuses the question whether a plaintiff‘s 
nationality or domicile can ground general jurisdiction with the 
question whether plaintiff‘s nationality or domicile can be 
considered in the kind of all-things-considered due process 
 
29 See id. at 2850–58.  Of course, incorporation in the state is itself a sufficient 
basis for general jurisdiction by analogy to a natural person‘s domicile.  See 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–65 (1940) (holding that domicile alone is 
sufficient to exercise general jurisdiction); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 TULANE J. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 111, 118, 122 (1999) (justifying jurisdiction on that basis through ex ante 
categorical balancing). 
30 J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
31 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
32 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: 
Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 385, 390–91 (2004) (―It is one thing to say 
that a corporation should not be heard to complain if sued on an unrelated claim 
in the place that is its legal home.  It is quite another endlessly to proliferate such 
homes—to debase the notion of a jurisdictional ‗headquarters‘—in the process 
neglecting the fact that the original fiction was ‗presence,‘ not ‗domicile.‘‖) 
(footnotes omitted).  
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analysis that I believe is appropriate for both specific and general 
doing business jurisdiction.33 
In most cases of general activity-based jurisdiction, except 
perhaps those involving law animated by a deterrent purpose, the 
state lacks the sort of regulatory interest that, I was happy to see, 
the Court recognized as typical of cases involving specific 
jurisdiction.34  In addition, unless the plaintiff is domiciled in the 
state where she sues, in most cases of general activity-based 
jurisdiction, it is hard to discern a legitimate plaintiff or state 
interest in having or providing access to the forum.  But the 
Court‘s footnote seems to foreclose such reasoning altogether.  Of 
course, the chosen metaphor (or fiction) also seems to foreclose the 
possibility that due process in the context of general doing 
business jurisdiction might mean one thing for a domestic 
corporation, which will always have at least one ―home‖ in the 
United States, and a foreign corporation, which usually will not.35 
Nicastro is close to an unmitigated disaster.  Justice Kennedy for 
the plurality again proves himself distinguished only at platitudes 
(―the Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty in 
the name of expediency‖).36  He manages both to acknowledge and 
confound the Court‘s belated recognition that due process protects 
individual and not sovereign interests, and having observed that 
the case ―presents an opportunity to provide greater clarity,‖37 
proceeds to spread darkness rather than light.  The whole notion 
that grounds of general jurisdiction—and in particular tag 
service—can be explained on a theory of consent or submission38 is 
 
33 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.5; see also Burbank, supra note 2, 749–53 
(2004) (discussing the due process analysis that is appropriate for general doing 
business jurisdiction). 
34 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855 (―[T]ies serving to bolster the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the 
forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.‖) (emphasis original). 
35 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 753 n.55 (pointing out that domestic 
defendants will always have domicile or place of incorporation in the United 
States and, therefore, will be subject to general jurisdiction, while foreign 
defendants have no ―such legal home in this country‖). 
36 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at  2791. 
37 Id. at 2786. 
38 See id. at 278 (―A person may submit to a State's authority in a number of 
ways.  There is, of course, explicit consent . . . .  Presence within a State at the time 
suit commences through service of process is another example . . . .  Citizenship or 
domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or principal place of business for 
corporations—also indicates general submission to a State's powers.‖). 
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pure fiction and a far cry from the relational theories that some 
scholars have articulated.39  The same is true of Kennedy‘s attempt 
to extend that justification to specific jurisdiction.  An exercise of 
power does not indicate either submission or intent to submit to 
authority, unless submission is conceived in terms of brute force. 
Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent is a far better-crafted opinion.  
Particularly noteworthy is her recognition that American states are 
irrelevant for purposes of international law and that the result in 
this case contrasts with the way in which the case would be 
decided in the EU (and thus could be thought to put U.S. 
manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage).40  For the present, 
and depending upon the views of Justice Breyer and Justice Alito, 
who concurred in the judgment,41 Nicastro deserves close study by 
counsel to foreign manufacturers that want to serve the U.S. 
market but do not want to be sued there. 
There you have it:  recent developments in three different 
doctrinal areas that make litigation harder to maintain in United 
States courts.  I am reminded of empirical work by Kevin Clermont 
and Theodore Eisenberg demonstrating that, contrary to 
traditional wisdom, foreign litigants, both as plaintiffs and 
defendants, fare better than domestic litigants in the federal 
courts.42  Granting the power of the explanation they suggest for 
 
39 See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY 
AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
DOCTRINE, POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS 29–36 
(2003) (discussing relational, power and instrumental theories of jurisdiction); 
Burbank, supra note 2, at 742–43 (reviewing von Mehren and outlining the key 
arguments in the text). 
40 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2801, 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
McIntyre UK should be brought to trial in the United States because it chose to do 
business in the United States as a nation and was not concerned with its 
component States and that the European Court of Justice would have exercised 
jurisdiction in an identical case, suggesting a disadvantage for U.S. plaintiffs); see 
also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 24 n.14, 
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2791 (2011) (No. 09-1343) 
(questioning whether foreign defendants should be required to establish 
minimum contacts with any particular state, rather than the United States as a 
single entity).  The author contributed to this amicus brief. 
41 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791–94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(refusing to depart from what, in Justice Breyer‘s opinion, is settled precedent).  
Justice Alito joined Justice Breyer‘s opinion. 
42 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American 
Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1996) (discussing empirical study showing 
that foreign defendants and plaintiffs actually win more often and offering 
tentative explanations of their results). 
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their results—case selection driven in part by the traditional 
wisdom—43 now may be a particularly good time to reassess how 
well the traditional wisdom about American litigation reflects 
reality.  There is evidence of greater affinity for at least some 
aspects of American litigation in Europe.  To the extent that the 
move towards greater reliance on private enforcement, including 
through representative litigation, is attributable to the direct and 
indirect power of the European Union,44 the traditional forces for 
the status quo are at risk, and the reassessment I have counseled 
should include comparative dimensions.  
 
 
 
43 See id. at 1133 (―We believe that the most plausible and powerful 
explanation for the foreigner effect is that foreigners are reluctant to litigate in 
America for a variety of reasons, including the apprehension that American courts 
exhibit xenophobic bias and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary distastes for 
litigating in a distant place.‖) (footnotes omitted). 
44 See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 14, at 100 (suggesting that EU 
member states turned to private enforcement due to institutional fragmentation in 
the EU that is akin to the separation of powers dynamic driving private 
enforcement in the United States). 
